

OS REGISTRY

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21 SEP 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:

Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT: NFIB Meeting, 25 September--the APEX System REFERENCE: Draft Memorandum for DD/NFAC from
Chief, Requirements and Evaluation
Staff, NFAC, TCS-891868/79,
same Subject


1. Action Requested: None, this is for your information only, giving the Office of Security's position on APEX proposal which is being discussed at the 25 September 1979 meeting of NFIB.

2. Background:

*This Office long has recognized the Community problems (too many cleared people, too much compartmented material) with the current compartmentation systems and has supported efforts over the years to address and adopt resolutions to them.

*There is a need for a strong DCI position implementing the E.O. 12065 call for revision of compartmentation programs as related to sources and methods. The APEX proposal seems to answer that need in the best form seen to date.

*The APEX proposal appears to be an honest effort to provide the producer and the consumer with voices in establishing rules of compartmentation and in determining what should be compartmented. This is most desirable and should go far in resolution of a historical problem that places



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the collectors of intelligence, the producers of finished intelligence and the consumer community at odds with each other.

*The selection of material for compartmented protection is a matter for command determination. The Office of Security's role is considered to be one of advising on "how" compartmentation procedures can best be drafted to achieve dissemination controls and protection being sought for sensitive intelligence.

*The objectives of the APEX proposal are not being met within the framework of the present separate control systems since the lack of centralized authority (in the hands of the DCI) will continue to result in widely different procedures of compartmentation exercised by individual activities with provincial, parochial views and interests. [redacted]

3. Staff Position: The Office of Security favors the approach of concurring in principle with the APEX proposal and requesting NFIB views and approvals of each milestone and phase of implementation. [redacted]

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